Quines Physicalist Epistemology :: Philosophy Theories Papers

Quines Physicalist EpistemologyQuine, in his article In Praise of the Observational strong belief, claims to establish naturalized epistemology and the work of science as a realist mapping of the world. Invoking Rortys criticisms of foundationalism from Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, this paper analyzes Quines reflectional sentence by discussing the unresolved issue of justification. It discusses whether a causal explanation can be a justified true belief and adequate grounding of knowledge. I suggest that the criticisms of Quine bypass similarities between Rortys spot and Quines. Such polemic positions - characteristic of the postmodernist/modern debate - imply a false dichotomy. These criticisms of justification and grounding ar best understood as a means to argue for discriminating viewpoints of human understanding. I conclude that Wittgensteins idea of human life form, or world-picture, provides further context for insisting upon interdisciplinary dialogue in lieu of a n fabricated hierarchy of specialized sciences. In his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty argues that Quines doctrines of indeterminacy of translation and ontological relativity call for the end of epistemology. Nonetheless, Rorty criticizes Quines physicalist stance. According to Rorty, Quines claim that observation sentences are a foundation for empiricism contains a contradictory ontological bias. In a more recent article In Praise of the Observation Sentence (1993), Quine allegedly clarifies his physicalist epistemology addressing criticisms analogous to Rortys. Quine states that naturalized epistemology is not a theory about an internal domain of qualia it is an intermediate position between what Quine calls old phenomenalism and anti-epistemology. (1) He argues that observation sentences entail observations of the world itself that are not entirely subjective. Consequently, in comparison to old, that is, analytical phenomenalism, Quine claims that his use of l anguage and logic is a more realistic sage reconstruction of knowledge. (2) In this paper, I examine Rortys challenge that Quines physicalist claims are contradictory and Quines recent defense. I conclude that Quines position is not inconsistent although his intermediate position within epistemology remains controversial.Overview of Quines Intermediate Position on ObservationFor Quine, classical epistemology has its most recent roots in British Empiricism. Consequently, according to Quine, epistemologys primary perplexity has been to clarify how we derive natural knowledge from sense data. The link between observation and the natural world is allegedly a resource for privileged entranceway to such natural knowledge. Quine in parallel to classical epistemology asserts that perceptual similarity is the basis of all learning, all habit formation, and it is testable in people and other animals by the reinforcement and extinction of conditional response.